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ANOTHER WEAPON: THE RICO STATUTE





ONGRESS enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) in 1970.1 RICO was designed primarily as a
"criminal statute aimed at eradicating organized crime syndicates."'2
After the enactment of RICO, Congress proclaimed that RICO should "be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."'3 The Supreme
Court, in interpreting the statute, has acknowledged that RICO was meant
to be an extraordinary federal remedy for particularly offensive activities
that harmed all of society. 4 Pursuant to this broad mandate from both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court, plaintiffs have used RICO for a variety of
purposes in both the civil and criminal context.
In the general commercial context, litigants have employed RICO for
multiple purposes, ranging from imaginative attempts to gain federal juris-
diction 5 to the use of RICO's treble damages remedy provisions to leverage
favorable settlements. 6 However, in the realm of environmental disputes,
RICO is not needed to acquire federal jurisdiction because the nine federal
environmental statutes all provide for jurisdiction in federal district court.7
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988. Ms. Mack is
currently an associate at the Dallas, Texas law firm of Locke Purnell Rain Harrell.
1. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. S. REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 comment (1988).
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (White, J.).
5. State courts now have concurrent jurisdiction. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455
(1990).
6. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently reversed a district court's order denying
sanctions for bringing a frivolous suit in order to extract a settlement and remanded the case
for consideration of appropriate sanctions. See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1517-23
(11th Cir. 1991).
7. The nine statutes include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n (1988); the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
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Thus, far from a jurisdictional tool in the environmental context, RICO can
be viewed simply as one more draconian statute in the environmental plain-
tiff's arsenal.
The advent of environmental awareness has led victims of environmental
wrongdoings to search for alternative ways to prosecute perceived perpetra-
tors. Even though federal and state environmental laws have gained more
notoriety, plaintiffs are constantly seeking to add more punch to claims of
environmental wrongdoing. By charging a defendant with a violation of the
RICO statute in addition to an environmental violation, a plaintiff may
strike a more effective blow. Indeed, a legitimate RICO cause of action adds
a new dimension to any lawsuit.
As the federal RICO statute is currently drafted, environmental crimes
are not "predicate acts" providing the foundation for RICO liability.8 Ac-
cordingly, plaintiffs seeking relief from environmental wrongdoings utilize
RICO as a secondary or tertiary statute from which to attempt to recoup
losses and punish violators. Even if not the primary claim, the treble dam-
age and attorneys' fees provisions of the civil RICO statute can provide po-
tent weapons against violators.9 The cost of defending a RICO case,
combined with the risk of losing, is deemed by some defendants to be high
enough to force settlements and deter future wrongful conduct.
While the fear of treble damages and the stigma of a "racketeer" label
may force many a RICO defendant into settlement, many other RICO de-
fendants refuse to settle due to the difficulty of establishing a RICO claim.
Indeed, RICO requires a plaintiff to prove an offense within an offense by
essentially establishing that two or more criminal acts occurred. Numerous
other requirements further complicate the RICO statutory scheme. Despite
the complexity of the statute, RICO is employed more frequently and has
become more commonplace in the environmental arena. This Article
surveys the use of the RICO statute in the prosecution of environmental
2671 (1988); the Marine Protection, Research" and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445
(1988) and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). How-
ever, these are not the only statutes that qualify as conservationist-oriented. See Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
8. At least one state's RICO statute defines environmental offenses as predicate acts. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13.1E-133 (West Supp. 1991). New Mexico is considering legislation to
amend its state RICO-type statute to include environmental offenses as predicate acts. S. Res.
635, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. 1991 (introduced February 14, 1991).
9. This potent weapon may in fact be unconstitutional. Because the RICO statute per-
mits the imposition of treble damages, a RICO violation carries serious punishment. Conse-
quently, it has been said the Constitution requires that the RICO statute should give fair
warning of the proscribed behavior. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)
("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes."). At least one Supreme Court Justice has stated the pattern requirement is so
vague that even the Supreme Court had difficulty in setting forth a definition. See H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (pattern is "some
requirement beyond the mere existence of multiple predicate acts... but what that something
more is, is beyond me."). See generally George C. Freeman & Kyle E. McSlarrow, RICO and
the Due Process "Void for Vagueness" Test, 45 Bus. LAW. 1003 (May 1990) (discussing recent
cases where constitutional issue could have been raised but was not). The Supreme Court has
declined to consider the constitutionality issue directly. See United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d
38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986).
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offenses, both civil and criminal. The Article focuses first on the RICO stat-
ute and the elements necessary to establish a RICO violation. The Article
then reviews and analyzes cases that demonstrate the use of the RICO stat-
ute in connection with the prosecution of environmental offenses. Finally,
the Article concludes with an assessment of the continued use of RICO to
prosecute offenses which were previously only regulated pursuant to envi-
ronmental regulatory schemes.
II. THE RICO STATUTE: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Four Sections
The liability provision of the RICO statute is divided into four sections.10
The first section, section 1962(a), prohibits investment of income derived
from a "pattern of racketeering activity." Section 1962(a) provides in perti-
nent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity...
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income .... in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities from which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce.1
In order to establish a violation of section 1962(a), some courts have re-
quired a plaintiff to meet the proximate cause requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c),' 2 which instructs plaintiffs to allege injury "by reason of" a viola-
tion of section 1962(a). 13
The second section, section 1962(b), provides as follows: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activi-
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
11. Id. § 1962(a).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides in pertinent part: "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee."
13. See Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 714, 717
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp. 1407, 1408-10 (N.D. Ill.
1988)); see also Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs'
§ 1962(a) claim failed because "they have not alleged injuries stemming directly from the de-
fendants' alleged use or investment .... Unlike Section 1962(c), subsection (a) requires such a
separate and traceable injury, and plaintiffs have alleged only injuries traceable to the alleged
predicate acts."); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75,.82-83 (2nd Cir. 1990) (plaintiff must
show injury by reason of use of racketeering income); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357 (3rd
Cir. 1989) (injury must be caused by use or investment and is truly distinct from injury caused
by predicate acts); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150-55 (10th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 76, 107 L. Ed. 2d. 43 (1989); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
912 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 9999 (U.S. July 15,
1991) (No. 91-95) (dicta discussion); Old Time Enters., Inc. v. International Coffee Corp., 862
F.2d 1213, 1219 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of RICO claims because plaintiffs failed
to allege injury proximately caused by violations of the statute).
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ties of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 14 Section 1962(b) re-
quires a "showing of a relationship or nexus between the pattern of
racketeering activity and the interest or control obtained."' 15 Plaintiffs must
also establish "a causal connection between defendant's interest or control
and its injuries."' 16
Section 1962(c), the third section, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 17
To establish a section 1962(c) violation, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia,
"(1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering
activity."' 8
The fourth and final section, section 1962(d), is the "conspiracy" section
of RICO. Section 1962(d) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any per-
son to conspire to violate any of the provisions of Subsections (a), (b), or (c)
of this section."' 19 Section 1962(d) essentially requires an agreement among
the defendants to participate in the affairs of the "enterprise" through the
commission of two or more predicate acts. 20
Proof of an "enterprise," a "pattern of racketeering," and the existence of
the necessary "person" subject to liability are necessary to establish RICO
liability under each of the four section 1962 provisions. The "person" ele-
ment is simple to establish because the RICO statute defines almost any indi-
vidual or organization as a "person." For purposes of the RICO statute, a
person has been defined as "an individual or legal entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property." 2 1
B. The Enterprise Element
1. Legal Enterprises
The finding of an enterprise is an essential prerequisite to imposing RICO
liability. Congress intended the RICO statute to punish, inter alia, illegal
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
15. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 55 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(citing United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
16. Litton Indus. Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 438, 452 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
18. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
20. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978).
21. LITIGATION SEC. OF THE A.B.A., MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSINESS TORT
LITIGATION § 5.06 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. Some courts,
however, have held that municipalities are not persons even though they are capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property. See Albanese v. City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F.
Supp. 563, 568-69 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 914




activity that operates through formal, legitimate enterprises.22 This inter-
pretation is supported by the actual language of the RICO statute, which
defines "enterprise" as "includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation,
or association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." '2 3
The statute itself provides for two types of enterprises: "entity" enter-
prises and "association-in-fact" enterprises. With respect to an "entity" en-
terprise, a legitimate business fits the description. However, not every
business is necessarily an enterprise. For example, "[w]hen the alleged sec-
tion 1962(c) violator is a legal entity, such as a corporation, this required
separation is not established merely by showing that the corporation,
through its employees, officers, and/or directors, committed a pattern of
predicate acts in the conduct of its own business."'24 Accordingly, the busi-
ness must be separate and distinct from the actual racketeering acts in order
to establish that a business is an enterprise.
Moreover, legitimate entities cannot be both enterprises and defendants
under one section of RICO - section 1962(c). "The clear majority [of
courts] holds that where a named defendant is also the alleged RICO enter-
prise, there is an untenable identity of the RICO person and RICO enter-
prise."125 In other words, the alleged culpable "person," the RICO
defendant, must be distinct from the alleged RICO enterprise under section
1962(c).26 This distinction recognizes that, in some instances, the enterprise
itself may be nothing more than a passive instrument or victim of the alleged
racketeering activity. 27 Under the three other RICO sections, sections
1962(a), (b) and (d), identity of defendant and enterprise is permissible.
2. Association-in-Fact Enterprises
The second type of enterprise is an "association-in-fact" enterprise. "To
establish an association-in-fact enterprise a plaintiff must 'show "evidence of
an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and.., evidence that the vari-
ous associates function as a continuing unit." ' ".28 Specifically, "[a]n associ-
ation-in-fact enterprise . . . (1) must have an existence separate and apart
22. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981); ARTHUR F. MATHEWS, CIVIL
RICO LITIGATION 215 (1985). In Turkette the Supreme Court also rejected the theory that
the enterprise element only encompasses legitimate enterprises. Indeed, illegitimate enterprises
are also within the scope of RICO. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
24. Old Time Enters., Inc. v. International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir.
1989).
25. Bishop v. B.J.J. Brake Co., 632 F. Supp. 10, 11 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd sub. nom,
Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986) (dismissal required where
defendant and enterprise are same).
26. This argument is not applicable to sections 1962(a), (b), and (d). See Haroco v. Amer-
ican Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
27. Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1058 (1986). It is important to note that an enterprise may play three other roles distinct from
or in addition to its role as victim: perpetrator, instrument and prize. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. United States Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1260 n.5 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Rose v.
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 358 (3rd Cir. 1989)).
28. Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Atkinson v.
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from the pattern of racketeering, 29 (2) must be an ongoing organization and
(3) its members must function as a continuing unit shown by a hierarchial or
consensual decision making structure. ' 30 Courts have concluded that many
different types of gatherings of individuals and entities are sufficient to estab-
lish an "association-in-fact" enterprise.31 Essentially, as long as a plaintiff
has pleaded these three criteria, a plaintiff has alleged a proper "association-
in-fact" enterprise.
Ten years ago, the Supreme Court analyzed in a criminal case the ele-
ments for establishing the existence of an "association-in-fact." In United
States v. Turkette 32 the Supreme Court held that prosecutors must establish,
inter alia, a distinction between the "association-in-fact" enterprise and the
"pattern of racketeering activity" in order to obtain a conviction. 33 In other
words, according to the high court, proof of the "pattern" does not necessar-
ily establish proof of an "enterprise." Importantly, although the Supreme
Court emphasized that an "enterprise" must be distinct from the "pattern of
racketeering activity," "if the individuals associate together to commit sev-
eral criminal acts, their relationship gains an ongoing nature, coming within
the purview of RICO."' 34 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ment, in actual practice, the proof requirements for the "enterprise" and
"pattern of racketeering" often coalesce. 35
Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032
(1987) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
29. Associated individuals cannot be an "enterprise" sufficient to support a RICO claim
unless that association actually exists separate and apart from the alleged "pattern of racke-
teering." Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 901 F.2d 404, 433 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Delta
Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1079 (1989)); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1987)
(enterprise must have an existence apart from commission of predicate acts).
30. Delta Truck, 855 F.2d at 243 (citing Manax, 842 F.2d at 811).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 619 (11th Cir. 1990) (two or three
leaders and several core individuals sufficient); Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651
F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (association of corporate entities sufficient); Austin v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667, 668-69 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (broker
and two brokerage houses sifficient).
32. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
33. In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both
the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.
The pattern of racketeering is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts....
The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or infor-
mal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.
The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering
committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to estab-
lish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does
not necessarily establish the other. The "enterprise" is not the "pattern of rack-
eteering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity
in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all remains a separate
element which must be proved by the Government.
Id. at 583. Even though the Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of a criminal
prosecution, it is nevertheless applicable to civil cases. See, e.g., Ocean Energy II, Inc., v.
Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1989); Manax, 842 F.2d at 811.
34. Montesano, 818 F.2d at 427.
35. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 521, 522 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
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C The "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Element
The "pattern of racketeering activity"-a mandatory element for all four
of the RICO sections-requires at least two acts which qualify as "racketeer-
ing activity." One of the acts must have occurred after the effective date of
the RICO chapter, October 15, 1970, and the last one must have occurred
within ten years after the commission of a prior act of "racketeering activ-
ity."' 36 The acts of "racketeering activity" necessary to form a predicate for
the "pattern" must be acts that are either chargeable under several generally
described state criminal laws or "indictable" under specific federal criminal
statutes.37 To establish a pattern, the predicate acts, in combination, must
demonstrate "continuity" or a "threat of continuing harm."
38
1. Predicate Acts
The pattern element is probably the most difficult element to establish.
First, a RICO plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence39 at
least two predicate acts as described in the previous paragraph. The predi-
cate act requirement obligates a plaintiff to establish an offense within an
offense because proof of the underlying acts is essential to establishing a
RICO claim. The most commonly employed predicate acts are mail and
wire fraud.4°
The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises... places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or re-
ceives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail ... which it is directed to be delivered by the person
to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.4 '
To establish that a defendant in question committed mail fraud, a plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: That each defendant willfully and knowingly devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
U.S. 1025 (1984) (enterprise element satisfied by an alleged association of persons over a period
of two years to use confidential information to purchase stock even though the same evidence
would have been offered to prove the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consisting of a
scheme to carry out securities fraud violations).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
37. Id. § 1961(1).
38. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
39. Fleischauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1122, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1029 (1990), and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1473, 108
L. Ed. 2d 611 (1990). For a discussion of the failure to impose a higher standard of proof,
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 532-35 (9th Cir. 1987) (Boochever, J.
dissenting).
40. Mail and wire fraud are the foundation for liability for most environmental RICO
cases. See discussion infra notes 80-131 and accompanying text.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
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pretenses, representations or promises; and Second: That each defend-
ant caused the services of the United States Postal Service to be used for
the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud.42
The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes
to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication
in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures
or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or
both.43
To establish that a defendant committed wire fraud, a plaintiff must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: That each Defendant willfully and knowingly devised a scheme
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false pretenses, representations or promises; Second: That each Defend-
ant or someone associated with the scheme transmitted or caused to be
transmitted by wire communication writings or sounds for the purpose
of executing the scheme to defraud. Third: That the transmission was
interstate.44
To act with "intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with the spe-
cific intent to deceive, ordinarily for the purpose of causing some financial
loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to one's self."'45 Negli-
gence or mistake or mismanagement generally do not constitute guilty
knowledge or intent to defraud. 46
The words "scheme" and "artifice" as used in the mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes include any plan or course of action intended to defraud
others of money or property or to obtain by false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, money or property from persons so deceived. 47
Indeed, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence all the
elements, inter alia, of the criminal offense that is the predicate act in order
to attempt to meet the RICO proof requirements.
It is important to note that a RICO claim premised on any type of fraud
must be pleaded with sufficient particularity so as to satisfy the requirements
42. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 21 § 5.071]; 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
44. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 21 § 507[1]; see 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United
States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1171 (5th Cir. 1986).
45. See United States v. Fowler, 735 F.2d 823, 829 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984), coram nobis
granted, 891 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1990); Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
46. United States v. Sheiner, 273 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d
337 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); see Fowler, 735 F.2d at 828-29 (inadver-
tent mailing of envelope through interstate mail system is a good faith defense to federal mail
fraud); Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (nonperform-
ance of a contract, without intent to deceive, does not constitute fraud).
47. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 21 §§ 5.07[2], [4].
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of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 A properly pleaded
complaint must both describe the scheme to defraud and detail how the use
of the mails or wires further that scheme.49 At least one federal district
court has held that a plaintiff must "specify the time, place and contents of
the alleged mail and wire fraud, the identity of the person making the repre-
sentation and the consequences of the misrepresentation." 50 Rule 9(b) is
thought to protect the RICO defendant because "the concepts within the
[RICO] statute are so nebulous that if the cause of action were only gener-
ally pled, a defendant would have no effective notice of a claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief."5' Accordingly, the RICO plaintiff should
beware the pitfalls of Rule 9(b). Likewise, Rule 9(b) provides many RICO
defendants with a basis for dismissing a vague RICO complaint.
2. Continuity
In addition to establishing predicate acts, a RICO plaintiff must demon-
strate a "pattern" of continuing harm. "The term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship between the predicates [and] 'threat of continuing
activity.' "52 "It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines
to produce a pattern. '5 3 It is not enough to plead that the alleged racketeer-
ing activities are related; "[t]o establish a RICO pattern it must also be
shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or that they otherwise con-
stitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity."' 54 " 'Continuity' is both
a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of re-
peated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future
with the threat of repetition."' 55 In explaining the two different types of con-
tinuity, the Supreme Court has noted:
A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a
closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a
substantial period of time. . . . Often a RICO action will be brought
before continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability
depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated.5 6
Courts have found continuity to exist in a variety of fact scenarios. For
example, in Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority,57 the Sev-
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The rule provides in pertinent part as follows: "Fraud, Mis-
take, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
49. See Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Weaver, 780 F.2d 1198, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
50. Coronet Ins. Co. v. Seyfarth, 665 F. Supp. 661, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also Laterza
v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (complaint dismissed
where factual allegations were "grossly inadequate").
51. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
52. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (quoting 116 CONG.
REC. 18,940 (1970)).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id. at 241.
56. Id. at 242 (emphasis in original).




enth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several RICO counts for failure to
allege a pattern. Despite allegations of the defendant's use of the mails for
several transactions, the court concluded that Triad had alleged only one
type of injury, which is insufficient to establish a RICO violation.58 Based
on these conclusions, the court determined that the "pattern" requirement
had not been met and that dismissal was appropriate.5 9
The same court, in Jones v. Lampe,6° upheld the dismissal of a complaint
on similar facts. In Jones, plaintiffs alleged 120 separate predicate acts -
most involving mail fraud - with injury to four victims. The circuit court
affirmed dismissal, finding that the facts only truly alleged one general
scheme, caused one distinct injury, and threatened no further harm.61
Many courts have determined a pattern to exist on less onerous facts. For
example, in Swistock v. Jones62 the Third Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of RICO claims.63 The court concluded that one perpetrator, two
victims, and numerous acts of mail and wire fraud over a period of fourteen
months satisfied the closed-ended continuity requirement. 64
58. Id. at 595.
59. Id.
60. 845 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 758; see also Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie &
Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1989) (this "is simply not a case that involves long-term criminal
conduct or activity that could, in common sense, be called a pattern of racketeering"); Lane v.
Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 134, 112 L. Ed.
2d 48 (1990) (no allegation that Peterson posed a threat; accordingly, complaint dismissed);
Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 648 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (no suggestion that defendants
had visited any such alleged scheme on other individuals) (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc.,
814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987)); Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989)
(defendant was isolated offender engaged in one shot effort to inflict single injury and thus no
valid RICO claim); Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1986)
(no pattern where all allegations of fraud related to the settlement of insurance claim arising
out of one accident); Azurite Corp. v. Amster & Co., 730 F. Supp. 571, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("In light of the brief duration of the alleged scheme, and the failure to plead any threat of on-
going or past activity, the Court finds that plaintiff's RICO claims must be dismissed in their
entirety"); Continental Realty Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 729 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (mail and wire fraud over one year period fails to show continuity); Disandro-Smith &
Assocs., P.C., v. Edron Copier Serv., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 912, 916 (D.R.I. 1989) ("three sales of
used copy machines as new ... do not amount to the 'long-term criminal conduct' that civil
RICO is intended to redress"); Fry v. General Motors Corp,, 728 F. Supp. 455, 458-59 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (activities were not a way of conducting business, thus continuity requirement not
met); Ferdinand Drexel Inv. Co., v. Alibert, 723 F. Supp. 313, 331-33 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd
without op., 904 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, Ill S. Ct. 154, 112 L. Ed. 2d
120 (1990) (two mailings, even if assumed to be fraudulent, do not satisfy continuity require-
ment when directed to one person within a one month period); Orchard Hills Co-Op. Apts.,
Inc. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan, 720 F. Supp. 127, 131 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (no continuity
established when there was "only one general scheme.., one major transaction... one actual
victim ... one distinct injury ... and threatened no repeated harm").
62. 884 F.2d 755 (3rd Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 759.
64. Id. at 757-59; see also United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 249-51 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 139, 112 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1990) (closed-ended scheme by
police officers to receive case payments for rendering "favors" over six years constituted a
pattern); Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1989) (mail and wire transmission by
one company to defraud two investors over a five year period satisfied closed-ended continuity
requirement); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 993-95 (8th Cir. 1989)
(closed-ended three-year scheme to defraud two sets of residential housing subcontractors
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Both the "enterprise" and "pattern" elements are critical to establishing a
RICO claim. The failure to prove these elements will defeat a RICO cause
of action. However, simply establishing these elements is not sufficient to
prove a RICO claim. To illustrate, the conspiracy section of the RICO stat-
ute, section 1962(d), requires additional proof: to establish a section 1962(d)
violation, some courts require proof of the existence of an agreement among
defendants "to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an enter-
prise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes."'65 In other
words, in addition to proof of the "pattern," "enterprise," and RICO "per-
son," a plaintiff must allege and prove facts which demonstrate that the de-
fendants had an agreement to participate in a "collective venture directed
toward a common goal."'66 Still other courts have required a showing that
each defendant must have personally agreed to commit two or more predi-
cate acts.
67
The Circuits are split as to the requirements of section 1962(a). Some
courts have ruled that section 1962(a), the "reinvestment" provision of the
RICO statute, requires a plaintiff to allege and prove, in addition to the "pat-
tern," "enterprise," and "person" elements, injury by reason of violation of
section 1962(a). These courts have concluded that "allegations of reinvest-
ment of the racketeering income back into the racketeering enterprise are
insufficient to satisfy the proximate cause requirement of a RICO claim
based on section 1962(a)." 68 Pursuant to this standard, the reinvestment of
the income - not the racketeering activity - must be the proximate cause
of injury. 69
based on mail fraud was a pattern); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 730 F.
Supp. 1525, 1533 (D. Or. 1990) (scheme involving the solicitation of kickbacks, one victim and
lasting for period of seven months constituted continuity); Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uni-
royal, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 926, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(sale of company by one corporation to another, use of mails and violations of securities laws
over an eight month period sufficient for continuity).
65. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom.,
Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
66. Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
67. Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries, Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991); but see Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir.
1990) (defendant can be liable under § 1962(d) for simply agreeing to the commission of a
pattern); Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1987) (personal
agreement not necessary); George v. Blue Diamond Petroleum, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 539, 550
(W.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendants who were aware of but did
not personally commit predicate acts of mail fraud liable under RICO).
68. Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (citing Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
69. Id.; see also Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., No. 90-1989, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19460,
at *17 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 1991); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir.
1990) (plaintiffs' § 1962(a) claim failed because "they have not alleged injuries stemming di-
rectly from defendants' alleged use or investment .... Unlike section 1962(c), subsection (a)
requires such a separate and traceable injury, and plaintiffs have alleged only injuries traceable
to the alleged predicate acts."); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990),
(plaintiff must show injury by reason or use of racketeering income); Reddy v. Litton Indus.,
Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 9999 (U.S. July 15,
1991) (No. 91-95) (plaintiff failed to plead or allege injury from use or investment of racketeer-
ing income); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357 (3d Cir. 1989) (injury must be caused by use or
investment truly distinct from predicate acts); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d
115519911
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Other courts have approached section 1962(a) somewhat differently. Ac-
cording to these courts, the only causation requirement for section 1962(a) is
injury from the pattern of racketeering activity itself. Assessing the elevated
causation standard, these courts have concluded that nothing in the "by rea-
son of" language limits a plaintiff's right of recovery to damages solely sus-
tained by use or investment of the income or enterprise. 70 At least one
district court has noted that employing the "use or investment" rule would
make it impossible to prove a violation of section 1962(a) under any
circumstances:
the "use or investment" of funds gotten from racketeering activity is
never measurable or traceable in a situation like that presently before
me, i.e. where the defendant acquires cash by racketeering and invests
the cash in itself. Because it is not traceable, no causal connection be-
tween the use or investment of ill gotten cash and an injury to the plain-
tiff is provable. The defendant argues that this lack of proof should
defeat the plaintiff's cause of action, even though § 1962(a) is the plain-
tiff's only recourse against a single corporate defendant who commits a
pattern of racketeering activity against a plaintiff without infiltrating
the plaintiff's enterprise.
I disagree with the defendant's view because I believe the statute con-
templates that corporations should be held liable for the damages pro-
vided by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) when they are the perpetrators or central
figures in a RICO violation. 71
This position is supported by the language of the Supreme Court in Sedima:
Section 1962 in turn makes it unlawful for "any person" - not just
mobsters - to use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity to invest in an enterprise, to acquire control of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity, or to conduct an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity .... If the defendant engages in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions,
and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business, or
property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in
the statutory language for an additional, amorphous "racketeering in-
jury" requirement.7 2
Based on this authority, a RICO plaintiff need only allege and prove that
money derived from the pattern of racketeering activity was reused or rein-
vested in the enterprise. Despite the fact that at least one court has con-
1147, 1150-55 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 76, 107 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1989)
(upholding dismissal of RICO claims based on plaintiff's failure to allege any facts showing
injury from the use and investment of racketeering income); Old Time Enters. Inc. v. Interna-
tional Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1219 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of plaintiffs'
RICO claims under subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) because, inter alia, plaintiffs failed to
allege injury proximately caused by violations of these subsections).
70. See Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990).
71. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 806-07
(E.D. La. 1986).
72. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 609 (1985) (rejecting submis-
sion that the injury must flow not from predicate acts but from the fact that they were per-
formed as part of the conduct of the enterprises).
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cluded that the additional causation requirement would make it impossible
to prove a violation of section 1962(a), 73 in reality the omission of the addi-
tional causation requirement will essentially result in a finding of injury
under section 1962(a) whenever there is a finding of liability under section
1962(c). Indeed, once it is established that a defendant acquired or main-
tained an interest or control in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, it is relatively simple to prove that the defendant reinvested at
least some money back into that enterprise.
Regardless whether section 1962(a) imposes an additional causation re-
quirement, all sections of RICO have their own discrete elements of proof
and all have overlapping criteria in the "enterprise," "pattern," and "per-
son" requirements. These multiple requirements make liability difficult to
establish under the RICO statute. Yet, due to the lure of treble damages and
attorneys' fees, many aggrieved parties will make such an attempt.
D. Amendments to the RICO Statute
It is important to note that the RICO statute may not remain in its cur-
rent incarnation for long because Congress is currently considering legisla-
tion that would amend civil RICO.74 Introduced by Representative William
J. Hughes of New Jersey, the RICO Amendments Act of 1991 cleared the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Ad-
ministration on May 2, 1991.75 The proposed legislation is known as "a
judicial gatekeeper" provision because it screens out civil RICO actions
which are not based on so-called "egregious criminal conduct."' 76 Appar-
ently, the Subcommittee was addressing concerns from the bar and judiciary
of pleading inflation. One court described the litigious climate and the
overuse of the RICO statute:
Since civil practitioners discovered the RICO statute some ten years
ago, it seems that the lure of transforming a simple, single damage con-
tract claim into a treble damage RICO claim has proved irresistible. To
sketch what is becoming more frequent is to begin to understand the
dangers of abusing the RICO weapon. Even if one ignores the in ter-
rorem effect of spurious treble damage suits, the danger of protracted
and extraordinarily expensive discovery engendered by civil RICO
claims is all too real.77
73. See Louisiana Power & Light, 642 F. Supp. at 806-07.
74. This is not the first time that Congress has proposed an amendment to the RICO
statute. On October 7, 1987, the House passed H. R. 5445, a RICO reform bill introduced by
Congressman Rick Boucher, by a vote of 371-28. H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
Senators Metzenbaum and Bumpers attempted to add the House-passed bill to an appropria-
tions bill. The attempt was tabled by the Senate by a vote of 47-44. In the 100th Congress
Senator Metzenbaum introduced S. 1523. S. 1523 was favorably reported by the Committee
on May 24, 1988, but efforts to bring the bill to the Senate floor were unsuccessful. In the
101st Congress, S. 438 was introduced by Senators DeConcini, Hatch, Symms, and Heflin.
The Committee discussed but did not act on S. 438.
75. H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
76. RICO Judicial Gatekeeper Bill Cleared by House Subcommittee, [New Developments]
RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH), at 5051 (May 10, 1991) [hereinafter RICO Developments].
77. PMC, Inc. v. Ferro Corp., 131 F.R.D. 184, 187 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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If enacted, the new bill would define the egregious conduct required for a
civil suit as "a pattern of criminal conduct which was an integral part of
ongoing. racketeering activities and which was characterized by a combina-
tion of aggravating circumstances that renders the defendant's conduct more
reprehensible than the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a violation" of
the RICO statute.78 In addition, a court would be required to dismiss claims
that fail to satisfy all three of the following criteria: (1)(a) the defendant
was previously convicted of a RICO violation or a predicate act based
on the conduct from which the claim arises or (b) the remedy is appro-
priate because of the magnitude or significance of the injury attributed
to the defendant's conduct; (2) the defendant was a major participant in
the criminal conduct responsible for the injury; and (3) the remedy is
needed to deter future egregious criminal conduct by the defendant or
others similarly situated.79
A close examination of this language reveals that this amendment might
not deter spurious RICO complaints. Indeed, the three new criteria are sim-
ple to allege, even if difficult to prove. A RICO plaintiff can easily allege
that treble damages are appropriate due to the alleged injury sustained, that
the RICO defendant or person was a major player in the criminal conduct,
and that without the remedy, violations would continue to occur. The last
two criteria are simply part and parcel of the case law that has already
evolved around the RICO statute. For example, pursuant to established
case law, the criminal acts constituting the predicate acts "must be con-
ducted by the defendant, and not by some other participant in the alleged
enterprise, in order to show a pattern of racketeering activity" against that
defendant.80 Thus, the requirement that a RICO defendant be the major
participant is already part of the law, even if not part of the statute. Simi-
larly, because a plaintiff is currently required to allege and to prove, at a
minimum, the threat of future or continued conduct pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc.,81 the third proposed criteria of dem-
onstrating the need for deterrence of future conduct, is not new. Accord-
ingly, this new legislation does not threaten to carry much bite in the general
civil context and will likely not deter a potential plaintiff seeking to bring a
RICO action predicated on environmental wrongdoings.
III. THE USE OF RICO TO PROSECUTE ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
Formerly viewed only as a means of eradicating organized crime, the
RICO statute with all its intricacies is now used as a means of prosecuting
78. RICO Developments, supra note 76, at 1-2.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Hutchinson v. Wickes Co., 726 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (citing United
States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated inpart on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983)); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322,
1331-32 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 4 65 U.S. 1005 (1984) (defendant must have committed
the racketeering acts); but see George v. Blue Diamond Petroleum, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 539, 550(W.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendants who were aware of but did
not personally commit predicate acts of mail fraud liable under RICO).
81. 492 U.S. 229 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 52.
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the environmental offender. That environmental offenses are not predicate
acts has in no way interfered with the prosecution of environmental offenses
utilizing the RICO statute. In the environmental context, prosecutors and
private civil litigants have found that the mail and wire fraud statutes serve
sufficiently as predicate acts.
One case in which RICO was employed to prosecute environmental
crimes is United States v. Paccione.82 The defendants were charged with the
operation of an illegal landfill and the illegal transferring, storage, and dis-
posing of medical and infectious waste. Defendants moved to dismiss the
indictment because "environmental crimes are not found in the statutory list
of offenses that can constitute predicate racketeering activity under the
RICO statute."'8 3 They urged that by charging environmental crimes as
RICO offenses, "the government [was] circumvent[ing] the express limita-
tion of RICO by characterizing defendants' alleged environmental miscon-
duct as mail or wire fraud."'84 The court rejected the argument, concluding
that "[t]he allegations of mail and wire fraud [were] not invalidated as predi-
cate acts because the alleged enterprise is accused of violations of environ-
mental laws as well." 85 The court reasoned that as long as mail and wire
fraud were properly alleged, mail and wire fraud may be predicate acts even
when "the enterprise is alleged to have engaged in violations of regulatory
schemes which do not constitute racketeering activity on their own."8s6
Defendants also sought to dismiss the RICO charges by arguing that they
should not be punished under the RICO statute when other regulatory
schemes - in this case, the environmental statutes - provided adequate
punishments in the event that defendants were found guilty. Not surpris-
ingly, the court rejected this argument as well, stating that "contrary to de-
fendants' contention, the existence of environmental regulatory schemes,
including criminal penalties, does not somehow 'preempt' the use of prop-
erly stated allegations of mail fraud as racketeering activity in charging a
violation of RICO because violations of that environmental regulatory
scheme are also implicated." T87 The court concluded that despite the fact
that a defendant may be charged with environmental crimes, mail and wire
fraud had been properly alleged.88 Thus, the court clearly found that envi-
ronmentally related offenses may go hand-in-hand with RICO charges.89 In
so holding, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that a RICO charge
for an environmental crime pushed RICO beyond its outer limits.9°
82. 738 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). While Paccione is a criminal RICO case, its
reasoning is instructive for the civil practitioner as well.




87. 738 F. Supp. at 699.
88. Id. Of course, numerous other offenses may be considered predicate acts. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).




In Standard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing9 the defendants did not question
the propriety of employing RICO for prosecuting an environmental offense,
but instead argued that the RICO requirements had not been properly al-
leged. The defendants in Boeing were generators and transporters of waste
deposited in a site owned by Western Processing. The plaintiff, Standard
Equipment, Inc., was a company engaged in the construction, mining, and
development business. It alleged that hazardous waste was improperly
stored at the site: "Plaintiff's basic allegation [was] that improperly stored
hazardous waste from the Western Processing site.., migrated through the
soil and contaminated [p]laintiff's property. '92 Simply stated, plaintiff al-
leged a classic environmental tort scenario in the form of a RICO claim.
The plaintiff alleged four federal causes of action and eleven pendent state
claims. Three of the federal claims were brought under the RICO statute,
and the fourth was brought pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).93
In its first RICO claim, the plaintiff alleged that all of the RICO defend-
ants were "an 'enterprise' which engaged in a fraudulent scheme to dump
rather than recycle waste at Western's site and to 'cover up' their illegal
activity."'94 The plaintiff further alleged that the RICO defendants had ac-
tual knowledge of Western's improper and illegal procedures, or at a mini-
mum, constructive knowledge of their illegal activity based upon Western's
deflated prices which could only be due to its failure to comply with costly
regulations. In order to allege its predicate acts, the plaintiff argued that
defendants either knew about ten identified false mail and wire communica-
tions or should have known that these communications were made in fur-
therance of a deceptive scheme.
For its second claim, the plaintiff alleged that only two of the defendants
were RICO enterprises and that the RICO defendants who were generators
and transporters of waste aided and abetted the enterprise by "sending West-
ern waste and thus enabling it to carry out its disposal business in an eco-
nomical fashion." 95 The plaintiff once again alleged mail and wire fraud,
contending that the RICO defendants should have known about the mail
and wire fraud scheme. For the third RICO claim, the plaintiff alleged a
conspiracy between and among the RICO defendants to violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) in violation of § 1962(d).
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on numerous grounds, the
first of which was procedural. The court concluded that the plaintiff had
met the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
because the complaint gave sufficient detail to allow the defendants to an-
swer.96 As the second basis for motion to dismiss, the defendants urged that
the plaintiff failed to claim that the alleged acts caused its injury. The court
91. 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2112 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
92. Id. at 2115.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
94. 23 Env't Rep. Case (BNA) at 2115.
95. Id. at 2115-16.
96. Id. at 2116.
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rejected this argument. 97 Citing Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank &
Trust Co. ,98 the court ruled that a RICO plaintiff needed only to allege that
it was proximately injured by the RICO enterprise's racketeering activity,
regardless of the context in order to overcome a motion to dismiss.99 In the
instant case, the court concluded that plaintiff's allegation of property and
business injury as a result of wrongful waste disposal was sufficient.'0°
Although the court rejected defendant's arguments as to Rule 9(b) and
causation, the court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss with respect to
one of plaintiff's three RICO claims and the CERCLA claim. 101 As for the
RICO claim, the court concluded that Count 2 was "devoid of any allega-
tion that [d]efendant 'participated' in any fraudulent scheme."' 1 2 Indeed,
plaintiff had only "allege[d] that [d]efendants 'acted with knowledge' of the
fraudulent scheme." 10 3 The court concluded that "[e]ven according to
[p]laintiff's own authority.., in order to be liable for the predicate acts of
mail fraud, [d]efendant must have been a participant in the fraudulent
scheme."' 1 4 The CERCLA claim was dismissed because the plaintiff had
not incurred any actual clean up costs.105 The defendants filed additional
motions to dismiss, which the court denied.106
As in Boeing, the defendants in Brittingham v. Mobil Corp. 10 7 did not
claim that RICO was improper in the environmental context. Instead, they
claimed that the RICO pleading requirements had not been met. Both the
district court and the court of appeals agreed.' 0 8 Defendant Mobil Chemical
Company produced Hefty "degradable" bags. The product packaging con-
tained the following statement: "New Hefty Degradable Trash Bags contain
a special ingredient that promotes their breakdown after exposure to ele-
ments like sun, wind and rain. This ingredient promotes degradation with-
out harming the environment."' 1 9 Plaintiffs were individual consumers who
bought Hefty bags, but claimed that the packaging statement was false be-
cause the bags cannot degrade in a modem landfill. They filed suit under
RICO - specifically, sections 1962(a) and (c) - based on the false and
misleading packaging.
The court focused on the enterprise element as a basis for affirming dis-
97. Id. at 2117.
98. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Standard Equipment, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2117.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2116.
102. Id. at 2119.
103. Id.
104. Standard Equipment, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2119-2120 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff reasserted this dismissed RICO count, having corrected the pleading defects. The
court permitted leave to amend the pleadings on April 3, 1986; see also supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
105. Id. at 2120.
106. See Standard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing, No. C 84-11290D (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3,
1986).
107. No. 90-1989, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19460 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 1991).




missal of plaintiffs' section 1962(c) claim. The court concluded that because
plaintiffs alleged that Mobil Corporation and Mobil Chemical were both
RICO "persons" and "enterprises," plaintiffs had not properly alleged a vio-
lation of section 1962(c). 1 10 The court held that "a 1962(c) enterprise must
be more than an association of individuals or entities conducting the normal
affairs of a defendant corporation."'1 I
The Mobil court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' section 1962(a)
claims.11 2 The court concluded that plaintiffs' section 1962(a) allegations -
that they paid higher prices and that they failed to receive the goods that
they bargained for - were simply not sufficient to state a claim under the
"use or investment" section of RICO. 1 3
Although the court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims, it opined that
plaintiffs may have had a valid RICO claim if they had sued individual de-
fendants under Section 1962(c).11 4 In other words, the Third Circuit ex-
pressed its acceptance of the use of RICO in the environmental context, as
long as the strict pleading requirements of the RICO statute are met.
Another case employing the RICO statute in an attempt to impose liabil-
ity for an environmental offense is Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
United States Gypsum. 1 5 Plaintiff had an ownership interest in a number of
commercial office buildings, hotels, and residential rental properties located
in various states which had been constructed and/or maintained with asbes-
tos-containing products that defendants allegedly manufactured, processed,
marketed, distributed, supplied, and/or sold. Because of the purported
health dangers associated with asbestos, plaintiffs apparently instituted an
inspection, monitoring, maintenance, and abatement program with respect
to certain buildings. The procedure was to determine the asbestos- contain-
ing materials present, the extent of the contamination, and the remedial
measures necessary to remove, enclose, or encapsulate the materials. Plain-
tiffs brought suit seeking reimbursement for the costs of these programs and
for damage that had or could occur from the presence of the asbestos-con-
taining products in their building.
Plaintiffs originally brought their suit under CERCLA, but the court re-
jected plaintiff's argument that the defendant incurred CERCLA liability. 11 6
The Court concluded that no factual allegations existed to support a claim
that there had been a "disposal" as defined under CERCLA.1 1 7 Although
plaintiff's CERCLA claims were dismissed, plaintiffs had pending a motion
for leave to amend which included, inter alia, a RICO count. The defend-
ants objected to the motion for leave, contending that plaintiff's RICO claim
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, de-
110. Id.; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at *8.
112. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19460 at *20.
113. Id. at *17.
114. Id. at *21.
115. 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989).




fendants argued that plaintiffs made conclusory allegations that defendants
engaged in unidentified acts of fraud and that plaintiffs failed to set forth a
time, place, or identity of the speakers or recipients of the fraudulent repre-
sentations. The defendants also urged that most of the wrongful acts alleged
were not acts of racketeering as defined by the RICO statute, including alle-
gations of misrepresentations without any assertion that the mails or wires
had been used in connection with the misrepresentation.1 1 8 The defendants
also specifically objected to each of the section 1962(a), (c), and (d) claims
for failure to meet the pleading requirements.
In assessing whether to grant leave to amend, the court noted that "Rule
15(a) reflects a general presumption in favor of allowing a party to amend its
pleadings." 1 19 In addition, the court noted that the Third Circuit, in keep-
ing with Congressional intent, has a policy of liberally construing RICO to
effectuate its remedial purpose. 12
0
Taking its mandate from the Third Circuit to resist the temptation to re-
strict civil RICO,' 21 the court analyzed plaintiff's proposed amendment to
determine whether plaintiffs had properly alleged a RICO offense. The
court found that plaintiffs alleged that from the 1950's to the 1980's "defend-
ants made representations in advertisements, sales literature, and trade pub-
lications that the asbestos-containing products were safe, nontoxic, fully
tested, suitable for commercial buildings and desirable."' 22 The court found
that plaintiffs further alleged that "defendants made these representations,
despite their knowledge of the falsity and having fraudulently concealed the
truth about the dangerous nature of the product, with an intent to induce
purchasers to buy the product."' 123 The court also found that plaintiffs al-
leged reliance on the representations and that they were damaged by the
representations.124 Because plaintiffs alleged that defendants conducted an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, the court found that
they had properly alleged another element of their claim.' 25 Having con-
cluded that plaintiffs presented a properly pleaded civil RICO claim, the
court granted their motion for leave to amend their complaint.' 2 6 By grant-
ing the motion for leave to amend, the court affirmed the use of RICO in the
environmental context.
In Bernfield v. Chester Valley Disposal Co. ' 27 the court did not specifically
address the issue whether RICO claims could be asserted in an environmen-
tal context, although, like the United States Gypsum 128 court, it implicitly
118. Id. at 1257.
119. Id. at 1259. (citing cases).
120. 711 F. Supp. at 1259 (citing Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1263.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 711 F. Supp. at 1262.
126. Id. at 1264.
127. CIV. A. 87-1373, 1988 WL 25283 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1988).
128. 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989).
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made such a finding by allowing the plaintiff to amend its complaint to in-
clude RICO claims. Plaintiff, an environmental broker, brought suit against
defendants, a trash hauling firm and its principal, alleging violations of the
RICO statute and various pendent state claims. Defendant moved to dis-
miss the RICO claims or in the alternative for more definite statement. The
court concluded that plaintiff had not properly pleaded a RICO cause of
action but granted plaintiff leave to amend its complaint in order to cure the
deficiencies. 129 The court in essence permitted RICO claims to be asserted
in an action involving largely environmental concerns.130
The district court in New Jersey considered another RICO/environmental
action in Albanese v. City Federal Savings andLoan Ass'n. 3 1 Plaintiffs, who
were homeowners, purchased property near a municipally owned landfill.
They filed suit against the township owning the landfill and other parties
based on alleged fraud in inducing their purchases. They charged that the
township and the other defendants knew that the landfill presented a health
hazard but nonetheless sanctioned and facilitated the development of resi-
dential housing in its vicinity. Plaintiffs argued that the township engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activity by fraudulently facilitating development
and by covering up the hazard presented by the landfill.
The township moved the court for summary judgment, contending that a
municipality cannot violate RICO. The court agreed.1 32 Quoting In re
CitiSource, Inc. Securities Litigation,133 the court reasoned that "[t]he issue
of intent is the Achilles' heel of the plaintiff seeking to impose RICO liability
upon a municipal corporation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Unlike an ordi-
nary corporation, a municipal corporation is incapable of the criminal intent
necessary to support the alleged predicate offenses." 134 Although the court
dismissed the township, holding that it was not a RICO person, 135 the court
said nothing of the propriety of the RICO claims in the environmental con-
text as against the other parties.
In a related case, Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.,136 the Third Circuit
affirmed that municipalities cannot be held liable for the predicate acts of
their officers or agents. The plaintiffs in Genty, like the Albanese plaintiffs,
complained that "the defendants failed to warn [them] about known dangers
associated with living near [an] allegedly toxic landfill"'137 and that city offi-
cials fraudulently assured them that the landfill was innocuous. They filed
suit pursuant to the RICO statute.
In order to determine whether to hold the municipality liable pursuant to
RICO, the court reviewed, inter alia, the mandatory treble damage provision
129. Bernfield, 1988 WL 25283 at *4.
130. Id.
131. 710 F. Supp. 563 (D.N.J. 1989).
132. Id. at 569.
133. 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
134. Albanese, 710 F. Supp. at 565.
135. Id. at 569.
136. 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 904.
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of RICO 38 - which, it found, provides for a remedy "far in excess of an
amount necessary to compensate an injured RICO victim' 39 - and con-
cluded that RICO damages are punitive in nature."4 The court also ana-
lyzed Supreme Court cases prohibiting punitive damages against
municipalities "unless a statute expressly provides such damages against mu-
nicipalities."' 41 Because RICO does not explicitly state that municipalities
will be liable for treble damages, the court concluded that to impose RICO
liability would be contrary to Supreme Court authority. 42
Even more compelling than its holding regarding municipalities is the
Genty court's conclusion regarding recovery under RICO for injuries, illness
and economic harm resulting from proximity to the dump. The court held
that plaintiffs simply could not recover under RICO for these types of harms
because "RICO provides for recovery only for 'any person injured in his
business or property.' "143 Because the language of the RICO statute does
not contemplate physical or mental harm to a person, the court determined
that plaintiffs could not recover for harmful exposure to toxic waste. 44
Thus, without harm to property or business, there will be no recovery under
RICO for environmental injuries. Personal injury resulting from environ-
mental wrongdoings is simply not compensable under the RICO statute.
In PMC, Inc. v. Ferro Corp. 145 the court, while clearly dismayed by the
number and scope of civil RICO claims in general, did not criticize the use
of RICO in connection with an alleged environmental offense. The action
arose from an asset purchase agreement between PMC and Ferro. PMC
alleged that Ferro misrepresented material information relating to PMC's
purchase of the assets of a chemical plant in California. The suit had thir-
teen claims for relief, including one claim brought under CERCLA and two
based on the RICO statute. As the basis for its racketeering claims, PMC
alleged, inter alia, that Ferro used the mails and wires for the specific pur-
pose of avoiding "its lawful responsibilities in terms of environmental mat-
ters." 46 While the issue before the court was a discovery matter and while
the court strongly suggested that PMC might not be able to withstand a
motion for summary judgment on the RICO claim,' 47 the court did not
comment that RICO was impermissible in the environmental context.
These cases simply underscore the trend to prosecute environmental
wrongdoers with every weapon available. Although not always successful,
creative plaintiffs can attempt to turn a CERCLA violation into a quasi-
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
139. 937 F.2d at 910 (citing cases).
140. Id.; see also supra note 9.
141. 937 F.2d at 910.
142. Id. at 914.
143. Id. at 918.
144. Id. at 918-19.
145. 131 F.R.D. 184 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
146. Id. at 186.
147. The court suggested that PMC would not be able to prove a violation of RICO be-
cause the court denied PMC discovery which PMC claimed it needed to establish the "con-
tinuity" element. Id. at 188.
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criminal act of racketeering. The trend to seek and employ more potent
prosecutorial weapons cannot be ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the RICO statute has been on the books for more than twenty
years, it has only been discovered by plaintiffs in the last ten. The use of
RICO in an environmental context has only recently gained momentum.
Because plaintiffs will forever search for different and more effective ways to
prosecute environmental offenses, the RICO statute will continue to be em-
ployed in tandem with the more conventional environmental statutes.
As society continues to focus on maintaining the integrity of the environ-
ment, aggrieved parties will search for the most powerful remedial tools
available to compensate for an environmental harm. In the civil context, the
recovery of treble damages provides for greater relief than many, if not all, of
the environmental statutes. Particularly when used in combination with an
environmental statute, RICO provides a very effective remedy. 148
Despite its complexity, RICO has gained notoriety as an effective
prosecutorial weapon. Those plaintiffs lured by the big bucks of treble dam-
ages are willing to accept its complexities. Environmental violators can take
no comfort from the fact that RICO is not specifically aimed at environmen-
tal wrongdoings. Seemingly an all purpose prosecutorial device, RICO has
emerged as a new weapon in the environmentalist's arsenal.
148. For example, the Clean Water Act provides only for injunctive relief. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(2) (1988) ("[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce ... an effluent
standard or limitation"). Thus, using RICO along with the citizens suit provision of the Clean
Water Act provides the potent combination of both a legal and an equitable remedy.
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